

Effects of Co-Evolution in a Complex Traffic Network

Ana L. C. Bazzan and Denise de Oliveira
Instituto de Informática
UFRGS
Caixa Postal 15064
91.501-970 Porto Alegre, RS, Brazil
{bazzan,edenise}@inf.ufrgs.br

Franziska Klügl
Dep. of Artificial Intelligence
University of Würzburg
Am Hubland
97074 Würzburg, Germany
kluegl@informatik.uni-wuerzburg.de

Kai Nagel
Inst. for Land and Sea Transport Systems
TU Berlin Sek SG12
Salzufer 17–19
10587 Berlin, Germany
nagel@vsp.tu-berlin.de

ABSTRACT

One way to cope with the increasing demand in transportation networks is to integrate standard solutions with more intelligent measures. This paper discusses the effects of integrating co-evolving decision-making regarding route choices (by drivers) and control measures (by traffic lights) We use microscopic modeling and simulation, in opposition to the classical network analysis. General questions here are whether co-evolution pays off, and, if so, what kind of evolutionary approach shall be used. This is challenging for networks other than the two-route one due to the complexity of route-choice behavior, as well as control strategies by the traffic lights. Moreover, the more agents, the less effective learning strategies are, when the integration among them depicts complex interrelationships. The approach was tested in different scenarios.

1. INTRODUCTION

Urban mobility is one of the key topics in modern societies. Especially in medium to big cities, the urban space has to be adapted to cope with the increasing needs of the commuters. In transportation engineering the expression of the transport needs is called *demand*. This demand (in terms of people, volume, etc.) is commonly used to quantify transport *supply*. This is the expression of the capacity of transportation infrastructures and modes. Supply is expressed in terms of infrastructures (capacity), services (frequency), and networks. The increasing demand of transport needs we observe nowadays has to be accommodated either with increasing supply (e.g. road capacity), or with a better use of the existing infrastructure. Since an expansion of the

capacity is not always socially attainable or feasible, transportation and traffic engineering now seek to optimize the management of both the supply and the demand using concepts and techniques from intelligent transportation systems (ITS). These refer to the application of modern technologies to the operation and control of transportation systems [12].

From the side of supply, several measures have been adopted in the last years, such as congestion charging in urban areas and others. From the point of view of the demand, it is now commonly recognized that the human actor has to be brought into the loop. With the amount of information that we have nowadays, it is almost impossible to disregard the influence of real-time information systems over the decision-making process of the individuals.

Hence, within the project “Large Scale Agent-based Traffic Simulation for Predicting Traffic Conditions”, our long term goal is to tackle a complex problem like traffic from the point of view of information science. This project is the result of an accumulated experience with microscopic models modeling tools for traffic and transportation management. These range from traffic signal optimization [2], binary route choice and effect of information on commuters [5], to microscopic modeling of physical movement [8]. An important milestone in the project is to propose a methodology to integrate complex behavioral models of human travelers reacting to traffic patterns and control measures of these traffic patterns, focusing on distributed and decentralized methods. Classically, this is done via network analysis. There, it is assumed that individual road users seek to optimize their individual costs regarding the trips they make by selecting the “best” route. This is the basis of the well known traffic network analysis based on Wardrop’s equilibrium principle [16]. This method predicts a long term *average* state of the network. However, assuming steady state network supply and demand conditions from day-to-day, this equilibrium based method cannot, in most cases, cope with the dynamics of the modern transportation systems. Moreover, it is definitely not adequate for answering questions related to what happens in the network *within* a given day, as the variability in the demand and the available capacity of the network tend to be high.

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In summary, as equilibria based concepts overlook this variability, it seems obvious that it is not adequate to be used in microscopic modeling and simulation. Therefore, the general aim of this paper is to investigate what happens when different actors adapt, each having its own goal. The objective of *local* traffic control is obviously to find a control scheme that minimizes queues in a spatially limited area (e.g. around a traffic light). The objective of road users is normally to minimizing their travel time – at least in commuting situations. Finally, from the point of view of the whole system, the goal is to assure reasonable travel times for *all* user, which can be highly conflicting with some individual utilities as in a social dilemma like nature. This is a well-known issue. Tumer and Wolpert [14] for instance shown that there is no general approach to deal with this complex question of collectives.

Specifically, this paper investigates which strategy is better for drivers (e.g. adaptation or greedy actions). Also, what is better for traffic lights? Act greedily or just carry on a “well-designed” signal plan? After which volume of traffic does decentralized control of traffic lights starts to pay off? Does single-agent or isolated reinforcement learning make sense in traffic scenarios? What happens when drivers adapt concurrently? These are hot topics not only in traffic research, but also from a more general agent point of view as it refers to co-evolution.

The challenge of the present paper is to tackle more realistic scenarios, i.e. depart from binary route choice. To the best of our knowledge, the question on what happens when drivers and traffic lights adapt in a complex route scenario (e.g. a grid) has not been tackled so far.

In the next section we review these and other related issues. In Section 3 we describe the approach and the scenario. Section 4 discusses the results, while Section 5 presents the concluding remarks.

2. BACKGROUND: SUPPLY AND DEMAND IN TRANSPORTATION ENGINEERING

Learning and adaptation is an important issue in multi-agent systems. Here we concentrate on pieces of related work which either deal with traffic scenarios directly or report close scenarios.

2.1 Management of Traffic Demand

Given its complexity, the area of traffic simulation and control has been tackled by many branches of applied and pure sciences. Therefore, several tools exist which target the problem isolatedly. Simulation tools in particular are quite old (1970s) and stable. On the side of demand forecasting, the arguably most used computational method is the so-called 4-step-process [11]. It consists of the four steps: trip generation, destination choice, mode choice, and route assignment. Route assignment includes route choice and a very basic traffic flow simulation, often, but not always, leading to a Nash Equilibrium. However several drawbacks exist. For a discussion of these issues see [1].

2.2 Real-Time Optimization of Traffic Lights

Signalized intersections are controlled by signal-timing plans (we use signal plan for short) which are implemented at traffic lights. A signal plan is a unique set of timing parameters comprising the cycle length L (the length of time for the

complete sequence of the phase changes), and the split (the division of the cycle length among the various movements or phases). The criterion for obtaining the optimum signal timing at a *single intersection* is that it should lead to the minimum overall delay at the intersection. Several plans are normally required for an intersection to deal with changes in traffic volume, or, in an traffic-responsive system, that at least one plan exist and can be changed on the fly.

In [2], a MAS based approach is described in which each traffic light is modeled as an agent, each having a set of pre-defined signal plans to coordinate with neighbors. Different signal plans can be selected in order to coordinate in a given traffic direction. This approach uses techniques of evolutionary game theory. However, payoff matrices (or at least the utilities and preferences of the agents) are required, i.e. these figures have to be explicitly formalized.

In [10] groups were considered and a technique from distributed constraint optimization was used, namely cooperative mediation. However, this mediation was not decentralized: group mediators communicate their decisions to the mediated agents in their groups and these agents just carry out the tasks. Camponogara and Kraus [3] have studied a simple scenario with only two intersections, using stochastic game-theory and reinforcement learning. Their results with this approach were better than a *best-effort* (greedy), a random policy, and also better than Q-learning. Also, in [9] a set of techniques were tried in order to improve the learning ability of the agents in a simple scenario. Finally, a reservation-based system [4] is also reported but it is only slightly related here because it does not include traffic lights.

2.3 The Need for Integration

2.3.1 Learning based approach

In [17], the main focus is not exactly that interaction. Rather, the paper describes the use of reinforcement learning by the traffic light controllers (agents) in order to minimize the overall waiting time of vehicles in a small grid. Agents learn a value function which estimates the expected waiting times of single vehicles given different settings of traffic lights.

2.3.2 Game theoretic approach

In [15], a two-level, three-player game is discussed which integrates traffic control and traffic assignment, i.e. both the control of traffic lights and the route choices by drivers are considered. Complete information is assumed, which means that all players (including the population of drivers) have to be aware of the movements of others. Although the paper reports interesting conclusions regarding e.g. the utility of cooperation among the players, this is probably valid only in that simple scenario. Besides, the assumptions that drivers always follow their shortest routes are difficult to justify in a real-world application.

In the present paper, we want to depart from both the two-route scenario and the assumption that traffic management centers are in charge of the control of traffic lights. Rather, we follow a trend of decentralization, in which each traffic light is able to sense its environment and react accordingly and autonomously, without having its actions computed by a central manager as it is the case in [15]. Moreover, the two-route scenario is a very didactic one and serves the purpose of the main aim of [15]. However, it is ques-

tionable whether the same mechanism can be used in more complex scenarios, as claimed. The reason for this is the fact that when the network is composed of tens of links, the number of routes increases and so the complexity of the route choice, given that now it is not trivial to compute the network and user equilibria.

2.3.3 Methodologies

Liu and colleagues [7] describe a modeling approach which integrates microsimulation of individual trip-makers' decisions and individual vehicle movements across the network. Moreover, in [7] the focus is on the description of the methodology which incorporate both demand and supply dynamics, so that the applications are only briefly described and not many options for the operation and control of traffic lights are reported. One scenario described deals with a simple network with four possible routes and two control policies. One can roughly be described as greedy, while the other is fixed signal plan based. In summary, in the present paper we do not explore the methodological issues as in [7] but, rather, investigate in more details, particular issues of the integration and interaction between actors from the supply and demand sides.

3. CO-EVOLUTION IN AN ITS FRAMEWORK

We have developed a framework using the agent-based simulation environment SeSAM [6] for testing the effects of adaption of different elements of the supply and demand. The testbed consists of sub-modules for modeling and generation of the network and the agents, modeling of traffic lights and signal plans, learning and adaptation mechanisms, generation of the library of routes, the route choice algorithm, etc. The movement of vehicles is queue-based.

In the present paper we tackle the feedback loop between supply and demand by means of studying scenarios in which drivers adapt (as in [5]) and traffic lights use learning mechanisms (e.g. in [2, 10, 9]).

The scenario we use to exemplify the approach is a typical commuting scenario where drivers repeatedly select a route to go from an origin to a destination. It is not so simple as a two-route (binary decision) scenario. Rather, it captures desirable properties of real scenarios regarding the aim of this study, namely the co-evolution among drivers and traffic lights.

To model the supply, we use a grid with 36 nodes connected using one-way links, as in Figure 1. All links are one-way and drivers can turn in each crossing. This kind of scenario is realistic and, in fact, from the point of view of route choice and equilibrium computation, it is also a very complex one as the number of possible routes is high.

Contrarily to simple two-route scenarios, in the grid it is possible to set arbitrary origins and destinations. Each driver has one particular origin (O) and destination (D) with a quite high number of optional route between them. To render the scenario more realistic, neither the distribution of O-D combinations, nor the capacity of links is homogeneous. On average, 60% of the road users have the same destination, namely the link labelled as E4E5, associated with node E4. Other links have 1.7% probability of being a destination. Origins are nearly equally distributed in the grid, with three exceptions: links B5B4, E1D1, and C2B2 have, approximately, probabilities 3, 4, and 5% of being an origin respectively. The remaining links have each a prob-




Figure 1: Grid 6x6 showing the main destination (E4E5), the three main origins (B5B4, E1D1, C2B2), and the “main street”.

ability of 1.5%. Regarding capacity, all links can hold up to 15 vehicles, except those located in the so called “main street” which can hold up to 45. This main street is formed by the links B3 to E3, E4, and E5.

The control is done via decentralized traffic lights. These are located in each node. Each has a signal plan which, by default, divides the cycle time 50-50% between the 2 phases. The actions of the traffic lights are to run the default plan or to prioritize one phase. The strategies are: i) always keep the default signal plan; ii) greedy (run green time for the phase with the higher occupancy); iii) use single agent Q-learning.

Regarding the demand, the main actor is the driver. The simulation can generate any number of them, each knowing about a given number of routes. Normally the simulations were done with drivers knowing one to five routes. These were generated via an algorithm that computes the shortest path (one route) and the shortest path via arbitrary detours (the other four). Drivers can use three strategies: i) select a route randomly (each time it departs); ii) select a route greedily (always pick the one with best average travel time so far); iii) select a route in an adaptive way meaning that the average travel times so far are used to compute a probability to select the route to use.

4. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION

In order to evaluate the experiments, travel time (drivers) and occupation (links) were measured. Due to lack of space we discuss here only the mean travel time over the last 5 trips (henceforward $attl5t$) and not all configurations. All experiments were repeated 20 times. The parameters used were: time out for the simulation (t_{out}) equal to 300 when the number of drivers is 400 or 500, 400 when it is 600, and 500 when there are 700 drivers; percentage of drivers who adapt is either 100 or zero (in this case all act greedily) but any combination can be used; percentage of traffic lights which act greedily is either zero or 100; a link is considered jammed if its occupancy is over 50%; cycle length for signal plans is 40 secs. For the Q-learning there is an experimentation phase of $10 \times t_{out}$, the learning rate is $\alpha = 0.1$ and the discount rate is $\lambda = 0.9$.

In Table 1 we summarize the $attl5t$ under different conditions and for different number of drivers. These are explained next.

Type of Simulation	Average Travel Time Last 5 Trips
greedy drvs / fixed TLs	100
adapting drvs / fixed TLs	149
greedy drvs / greedy TLs	106
adapting drvs / greedy TLs	143
greedy drvs / Qlearning TLs	233

Table 1: Average Travel Time Last 5 Trips for 400 Drivers, under Different Conditions

4.1 Different Strategies by Drivers and Traffic-Lights

For all scenarios described in this subsection, 400 drivers were used.

Greedy or adaptive drivers; fixed traffic lights. In the case of adapting drivers, the *attl5t* is 149 time units, while this is 100 if drivers act greedily. The higher travel time is the price paid by the experimentation which the drivers continue to do, even though the optimal policy was achieved long before (remember that the *attl5t* is computed only over the last 5 trips). The greedy action is of course much better after the optimal policy was learned. In summary, greedy actions by the drivers work because they tend to select the routes with the shortest path and this normally distributes drivers more evenly than longer routes.

Greedy or adaptive drivers; greedy traffic lights. When traffic lights also act greedily we can see that this does not automatically improve the outcome: the *attl5t* is 106. This happens because the degree of freedom of traffic lights' actions is low, as actions are highly constrained. For instance, acting greedily can be highly sub-optimal when for instance traffic light *A* serves direction D_1 (thus keeping D_2 with red light), when the downstream flow of D_1 is already jammed. In this case, the light might indeed give green for vehicles on D_1 but these cannot move due to the downstream jam. Worse, jam may appear on the previously un-jammed D_2 too due to the small share of green time. This explains why acting greedily at traffic lights is not necessarily a good policy.

Q-learning traffic lights. We have expected Q-learning to perform bad because it is already known that it does not have a good performance in noisy and non-stationary traffic scenarios [13]. In order to test this, we have implemented a Q-learning mechanism in the traffic lights. Available actions are: to open the phase serving either one direction (e.g. D_1), or the other (D_2). The states are the combination of states in both approaching links, i.e. $\{D_1_jammed, D_1_not_jammed\} \times \{D_2_jammed, D_2_not_jammed\}$. The low performance of Q-learning in traffic scenarios is due basically to the fact that the environment is non-stationary, not due to the poor discretization of states. Convergence is never achieved and so traffic lights keep experimenting.

4.2 Scenarios With More Drivers

For more than 400 drives we only investigate the cases of greedy drivers / fixed traffic lights versus the case in which both drivers and traffic lights act greedily in order to test whether or not increasing volume of traffic (due to increasing number of drivers in the network) would cause greedy traffic lights to perform better. This is expected to be the case since

Type of Simulation	Average Travel Time Last 5 Trips			
	Nb. of Drivers			
	400	500	600	700
greedy drvs / fix TLs	100	136	227	411
greedy drvs / greedy TLs	106	139	215	380

Table 2: Average Travel Time Last 5 Trips for Different Number of Drivers, under Different Conditions

once the number of drivers increase, greedy actions alone do not bring much gain; some kind of control in the traffic lights is expect to be helpful. In fact, 400, 500, 600 and 700 drivers mean an average occupancy of $\approx 40\%$, 47% , 59% , and 72% per link. In Table 2 the *attl5t* for these numbers of drivers are shown. The case for 400 drivers was discussed above. With more than 500 drivers, the *attl5t* is lower when traffic lights also act greedily. In the case of 700 drivers, the improvement in travel time (411 vs. 380) is about 8%. Thus, the greedy traffic lights are successful in keeping the occupancy of links lower resulting in reduced travel times.

4.3 Overall Discussion

In the experiments presented we could see that different strategies by the drivers, as well by the traffic lights have distinct results, in different settings. We give here the main conclusions. For the network depicted, increasing the links capacity from 15 to 20 would lead to much less jam (this was tested but is not shown here due lack of space). However, increasing network capacity is not always possible so that other measures must be taken. Diverting people and/or given them information both have limited performances. Thus the idea is to better use the control infrastructure. Therefore we have explored the capability of the traffic lights to cope with the increasing demand.

Regarding travel time, it was shown that the strategies implemented in the traffic lights pay off in several cases, especially when the demand increases. We have also measured the number of drivers who arrive before time t_{out} . Just to give a flavor of the figures, bad performance (around 75% arrived) was seen only when the drivers adapt probabilistically. This of course is a consequence of the high travel times (see Table 1). The general trend is that when the traffic lights also play a role, the performance increases, by all metrics used.

About the use of Q-learning, as said, single-agent learning is far from optimum here due to the non-stationarity nature of the scenario. This is true especially for those links located close to the main destination and the main street as they tend to be part of each driver's trip so that the pattern of volume of vehicles changes dramatically. A possible solution is to use collaborative traffic lights. In this case, traffic light *A* would at least ask/sense traffic light *B* downstream whether or not it shall act greedily. This however leads to a cascade of dependence among the traffic lights. In the worst case everybody has to consider everybody's state. Even if this is done in a centralized way (which is far from desirable), the number of state-action pairs prevents the use of multiagent Q-learning in its standard formulation.

5. CONCLUSION

Several studies and approaches exist for modeling travel-

ers' decision-making. In commuting scenarios in particular, the issue of how they adapt in order to maximize their utilities is one of those approaches. However, there is hardly any attempt to study what happens when *both* the driver and the traffic light use some evolutionary mechanism in the same scenario or environment, especially if *no central control exist*. Then, the co-evolution happens in a decentralized fashion, in which case some form of auto-organization or chaotic situations may arise. This is an important issue because, although ITS have reached a high technical standard, the reaction of drivers to these systems is fairly unknown. In the present paper we have investigated this loop. The results show an improvement regarding travel time and occupancy (thus, both the demand and supply side) when all actors co-evolve - especially in large-scale situations e.g. involving many drivers. This was compared with situations in which either only drivers or only traffic lights evolve, in different scenarios.

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